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Research Notes
Deciphering Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda’s Strategic and 
Ideological Imperatives
by Sajjan M. Gohel
Abstract
This research paper explores the current strategic and ideological agenda of al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-
Zawahiri. To better understand how al-Zawahiri aims to retain international relevance, survival and 
sustainability, the paper assesses al-Zawahiri’s speeches and actions in recent years that articulate his world-view 
objectives. Importantly, this paper will argue that although the “Far Enemy” remains a priority, and will not be 
abandoned by al-Qaeda, al-Zawahiri has renewed the terrorist group’s emphasis on the “Near Enemy” and seeks 
to create safe bases across the Islamic world for al-Qaeda and its affiliates to function and grow. This paper will 
also illustrate that it would be naive to dismiss al-Zawahiri and al-Qaeda’s relevance as a global threat as the 
Egyptian is laying the foundations for al-Qaeda’s future. The paper also compares and contrasts al-Zawahiri’s 
historical motivations and how that fits into his current doctrine. Lastly, this paper dissects al-Zawahiri’s 
paradoxical nature and mixed messaging which could impact on al-Qaeda’s attempts to replenish the terrorist 
group’s ranks.
Keywords: Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda, Bin Laden, terrorist organizations, Islamic State, Jabhat Fateh al-
Sham, Taliban, Egypt, Iran
Introduction
More than fifteen years after the September 11, 2001, attacks and more than five years since succeeding Osama bin Laden as head a of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri has been seen as an increasingly marginalised figurehead of rickety terrorist franchise organization. Lacking bin 
Laden’s charisma, failing to maintain unity within the al-Qaeda affiliates, and unable to launch major 
international attacks, al-Zawahiri also failed to take full advantage of the security vacuum created by the Arab 
Spring. In addition, al-Qaeda’s current leader appears unable to match the pulling power of his arch-nemesis, 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State terrorist group.
Between September 2014 and August 2015, al-Zawahiri did not make any public statements, creating 
uncertainty as to the direction he was taking al-Qaeda. His 11-months silence was unprecedented, especially 
as many key figures within al-Qaeda’s core and with its affiliates died in counter-terrorism operations. Most 
notably, this included al-Zawahiri’s designated successor Nasir al-Wuhayshi, who headed al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and the U.S.-born al-Qaeda spokesman Adam Gadahn.[1]
Despite all this, it would be unwise to write off al-Zawahiri, whose cunning is unmatched and for more than 
forty years has been plotting terrorist attacks.[2] Al-Zawahiri has always prioritised his own self-preservation 
whilst trying to keep al-Qaeda afloat. Despite having a $25 million bounty placed on him, that leads to his 
apprehension or conviction, al-Zawahiri remains at large, and has survived several targeted strikes over the 
years. [3] Furthermore, the trail to locate his whereabouts in Pakistan has gone cold since 2007.[4]
In August, 2015, al-Zawahiri ended his period of silence by affirming his allegiance to the then new head 
of the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Mansour.[5] Since then, al-Zawahiri has displayed a sense of practicality, 
pragmatism and willingness to adapt to the changing circumstances in the Arab and Islamic world. An 
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analysis of his statements demonstrates that he has strategically calibrated al-Qaeda’s priorities and managed 
to formulate a plan of action that may allow him to retain relevance amongst jihadists globally.
Far and Near: Al-Zawahiri’s Priorities
On 9 September, 2016 – two days before the 15th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks – al-Zawahiri released his 
speech The Defiers of Injustice, stating that al-Qaeda would “focus on…America and its allies, and to strive 
as much as possible to transfer the battle to their lands”, calling this “the first priority in the armed jihad 
today.”[6]
The Defiers of Injustice reinforced a message al-Zawahiri had already issued shortly after the 14th 
anniversary of the 9/11 attacks in 2015. In the second instalment of his Islamic Spring series, al-Zawahiri had 
stated “I call on all Muslims who can harm the countries of the crusader coalition not to hesitate. We must now 
focus on moving the war to the heart of the homes and cities of the crusader West and specifically America.”[7]
Al-Zawahiri appeared to be calling for lone actor attacks and instructed his followers to take inspiration from 
“the brave knights of the Paris invasion”–a reference to the Kouachi brothers, Cherif and Said, who had been 
responsible for the shootings at the Paris office of the satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, on January 7, 2015.
[8] The Kouachis claimed to have carried out the attack on behalf of AQAP.[9] Al-Zawahiri’s mentioning 
of them dovetailed with AQAP’s reference of the brothers in the 14th edition of its Inspire magazine which 
featured a “military analysis” of their attack on Charlie Hebdo by Ibrahim al-Asiri, AQAP’s chief bomb 
maker.[10] It appears somewhat opportunistic for al-Zawahiri and AQAP to closely associate with the 
Charlie Hebdo attack, several months after the incident and as one of the Kouachi brothers last had contact 
with AQAP in 2011 when Said trained there.[11]
Since the Arab Spring there has been only limited evidence of al-Qaeda directing or planning attacks on 
Western soil, with a few possible exceptions such as a nebulous plot by the Khorasan group in Idlib, Syria, in 
2014, apparently planning to target Western aviation.[12] Currently, if the West features high on al-Zawahiri’s 
target list, then it would be more about hitting them where al-Qaeda and its affiliates have an operational 
presence. For example, AQAP’s intention to attack U.S. embassies in the Persian Gulf in the summer of 2013 
and a string of attacks in recent years by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Murabitoun (The 
Sentinels) on hotels frequented by Westerners in the Sahel region.[13]
In order to understand what al-Qaeda is openly calling for in operational terms, one has to turn to al-
Zawahiri’s video entitled Carrying the Weapon of the Martyr, Episode 3, which was issued on 23 July 2016.
[14] In it, al-Zawahiri called on all al-Qaeda branches to kidnap Western civilians and soldiers in the Arab 
and Islamic world so that these could be traded against jihadists jailed in the West. This clearly contrasts with 
the practice of Islamic State of executing hostages and videotape their decapitations.
Amongst several well-known individuals that al-Zawahiri called to be released from Western prisons, is the 
blind Egyptian sheikh, Omar Abdel-Rahman, who is currently serving a life sentence in the United States for 
being behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York. The fact that al-Zawahiri would openly 
call for Abdel-Rahman’s release is odd, given their past differences. Both men had spent time together in 
prison in Egypt, following the massive round-up of members of al-Jihad, the group responsible for the 
assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. While al-Zawahiri and Abdel-Rahman shared jail time 
at the notorious Mazra’ah Turrah prison, they argued intensely about the best way to advance the cause of 
al-Jihad in Egypt and who should become its new leader.[15] Personal and strategic differences eventually 
caused a permanent and consequential split within al-Jihad.[16] Al-Zawahiri would move on and be 
instrumental in the creation of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) while Abdel-Rahman took control of a faction 
belonging to al-Gama’a al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Group) and became its spiritual leader.[17] There has never 
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been any public indication that al-Zawahiri and Abdel-Rahman had healed their rift, especially as Abdel-
Rahman died on February 18, 2017.
There are several ways to interpret al-Zawahiri’s open threats against the West. Firstly, the al-Qaeda leader 
might be renewing his intention of wanting to launch directed attacks within the United States and Europe as 
part of his ongoing competition with Islamic State to capture the jihadist mainstream. Secondly, al-Zawahiri 
is advocating attacks on Western targets in third countries where al-Qaeda and affiliates have a functioning 
infrastructure. Thirdly, al-Zawahiri’s threats might serve as a warning that in the long-term al-Qaeda will 
want to target the West, when he deems that the operational conditions are restored, but in the meantime 
he encourages his followers to carry out lone actor attacks. Lastly, al-Zawahiri’s messages could be more 
rhetorical, aiming to satisfy his customary followers while seeking to unify the jihadist ranks in an effort of 
connecting the Far Enemy with the problems nearer to home in the Islamic world.
Although it would appear that al-Zawahiri and bin Laden had a common strategic outlook, internal 
correspondence captured during the Abbottabad raid on Osama bin Laden’s Pakistani compound in 2011, 
presents glimpses of cryptic differences of opinion between the al-Qaeda leaders over the group’s direction in 
the post 9/11 environment. In one of the documents written by al-Zawahiri to bin Laden in August 2003, the 
al-Qaeda leaders appear to be discussing a draft speech on the ideological justification for jihad, accompanied 
by an explanation of their moral position. Al-Zawahiri wrote, “The author does not greedily intend to add 
to his predecessor’s works, but rather seeks to clarify several points.” [18] Al-Zawahiri, albeit very politely, 
appeared uncomfortable with bin Laden’s version of the speech and wanted to rephrase parts of the narrative.
Al-Zawahiri’s editing efforts on bin Laden’s original text include lengthy verses from the Quran to justify his 
suggested changes. He goes on to say “This meaning is very important to highlight to the righteous people of 
this time, for their hearts to be reassured that they are engaging in the same battles that were conducted by God’s 
messengers and their followers of the faithful people for all time….We hope that this message would enlighten the 
connection between the internal and external enemies in their goals and in their soldiers.”[19] The reference to 
“internal and external enemies” appears to be a reference to the Near Enemy (internal to the Islamic world) 
and the Far Enemy (external, principally the West) and for al-Zawahiri to ensure that there is a religious 
justification for al-Qaeda’s doctrine and rationale for potential future actions.
Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri first established a co-dependent relationship between their two factions, Maktab 
al-Khadamat (Services Office) and the EIJ, amongst the melee of the Arab mujahedeen camped in Pakistan 
in the 1980s.[20] Following the retreat of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, al-Zawahiri tried to convince 
bin Laden, as a matter of priority, to focus on the need for regime change in the Arab world. However, in 
the mid-to-late 1990s bin Laden persuaded al-Zawahiri that targeting the United States, and removing its 
influence from the Arab world, was key to creating the caliphate (Islamic state).[21] Bin Laden was pushing 
to fight the Far Enemy in both actions and doctrine. More than half of his speeches focused on the Far Enemy 
compared to a fraction that was directed at unseating Arab regimes, the Near Enemy.[22] On the other hand, 
al-Zawahiri’s communiques reflect a greater emphasis towards the Near Enemy, although the Far Enemy 
was by no means excluded from his invective.[23] In other words, al-Zawahiri was not so eager to prioritise 
attacking the U.S. mainland as bin Laden. Instead he opined that it would be more effective for al-Qaeda to 
focus its resources on U.S. targets in Afghanistan and Iraq.[24] This was more in line with al-Qaeda’s pre-9/11 
position and its bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the maritime suicide 
attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen in the year 2000.
While al-Zawahiri, publicly called for attacks in the West, privately, his instructions to affiliates gives evidence 
of more flexibility. In a May 2015 interview with al-Jazeera, Abu Mohammad al-Golani, the leader of Jabhat 
al-Nusra (The Support Front for the People), al-Qaeda’s then affiliate in Syria, revealed that al-Zawahiri 
had ordered him not to use Syria to plot against the West but instead focus on the Near Enemy. Al-Golani 
recalled, “We received clear orders not to use Syria as a launching pad to attack the US or Europe in order to 
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not sabotage the true mission against the [Bashar al-Assad] regime.”[25] Al-Golani’s disclosure indicated for 
the first time that al-Zawahiri was steering al-Qaeda away from Osama Bin Laden’s primacy of targeting the 
West.
Safe Bases and Un-Coupling
In September, 2013, al-Zawahiri issued his General Guidelines for Jihad wherein he emphasised the need 
for self-discipline and restraint, noting that al-Qaeda’s strategy “is a long one, and jihad is in need of safe 
bases.”[26] He added, “If we are forced to fight [local regimes], then we must make it clear that our struggle 
against them is a part of our resistance against the Crusader onslaught.”[27] Although al-Zawahiri explicitly 
delineated Western targets as the first objective, which should never be abandoned, he also believed that 
until that is attainable, implementing a more developed local strategy against the Near Enemy would help 
al-Qaeda’s long-term policy against the Far Enemy. However, al-Zawahiri also cautioned that would only be 
the case as long as the operational space to grow and function, without being under duress or attack, could be 
safeguarded.[28]
In July, 2016, when Abu Mohammad al-Golani announced that Jabhat al-Nusra was un-coupling from al-
Qaeda and changing its name to Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham (Front for the Conquest of Syria). Al-Zawahiri’s 
trusted Egyptian deputies, Abu al Khayr al-Masri and Saif al-Adel, helped formalise the de-linking.[29] 
Saif al-Adel’s voice, carries special weight as he was one of the few al-Qaeda leaders who strongly opposed 
the September 11attacks because these would, in his view, would put al-Qaeda in the direct crossfire of the 
United States.[30] Even after 9/11, al-Adel was critical of bin Laden and the main organiser of the attacks on 
the United States, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, for continuing to plot against the ‘Far Enemy’.[31]
In Syria, al-Qaeda approved Jabhat al-Nusra’s un-coupling so that its forces could concentrate on their fight 
against the al-Assad regime and form closer bonds with other Islamist groups fighting in Syria.[32] Jabhat 
al-Nusra is allied with Ahrar al-Sham, an organization that previously had been cautious when it came to 
develop closer links with Jabhat al-Nusra because of the al-Qaeda connection.[33]
The decision by Jabhat al-Nusra to cease fighting under al-Qaeda’s banner was months in the making and 
overseen by al-Zawahiri himself. In May, 2016, he released an audio recording saying Jabhat al-Nusra leaving 
al-Qaeda would not be an obstacle to “the great hopes of the Islamic nation.”[34] Al-Zawahiri’s message was 
an explicit clearance that enabled Jabhat al-Nusra to un-couple from al-Qaeda without breaking the bay’a 
(oath of allegiance) to al-Zawahiri.[35] In real terms, Jabhat al-Nusra’s un-coupling from al-Qaeda was more 
about organisational practicalities and public relations management than based on any ideological conflict. 
However, there was also a caveat entailed as al-Zawahiri also urged Syria’s jihadists to unify to create a “real 
caliphate,” in direct opposition to the one of the Islamic State, calling it “a matter of life and death.” [36]
A lesson appears to have been learnt by al-Zawahiri in the amicable way the un-coupling with Jabhat al-
Nusra was managed, at least in comparison to his obtuse way in dealing with jihadist issues in Syria in the 
past. To recall, in April 2013, al-Baghdadi had claimed that Jabhat al-Nusra was subordinate to him. Yet 
its leader, al-Golani refused to acknowledge al-Baghdadi as his leader and instead swore allegiance to al-
Zawahiri. At that time, al-Zawahiri had sent a confidential edict, ruling that al-Baghdadi was wrong not to 
consult with al-Golani who, in turn, should not have pledged allegiance to al-Zawahiri without first obtaining 
the green light from al-Qaeda.[37] Al-Zawahiri was ill-prepared to deal with the unfolding events in Syria as 
became fully apparent by the end of June 2014 when Islamic State, without prior consultation with al-Qaeda, 
announced the establishment of a global caliphate with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its caliph (Muslim ruler).
Despite the name change, the US-led coalition has not relented in its air strikes against the renamed Jabhat 
Fateh al-Sham, killing dozens of its fighters, including senior leaders like Abu Ibrahim al-Tunsi, Abu Omar 
al-Turkistani, Abu Afghan al-Masri, Abu Faraj al-Masri, and Abu Omar Saraqeb.[38] Furthermore, between 
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February 3-4, 2017, U.S. drone strikes killed several al-Qaeda core members in Syria including the Egyptian 
Abu Hani al-Masri, in Idlib, where the Khorasan group has been imbedded. [39]Abu Hani al-Masri was 
a close ally of al-Zawahiri and helped him to establish the EIJ Egypt in the 1980s.[40] In the 1990s, he 
facilitated the creation of terrorist training camps for the EIJ and al-Qaeda and was tied to the disrupted 
plot to target the US Embassy in Tirana, Albania, in 1998, which was timed to take place shortly after the 
U.S. embassy bombings by al-Qaeda in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998.[41] The elimination of Abu 
Hani al-Masri illustrates al-Qaeda’s continuing presence in Syria and signifies the U.S. intention to target 
individuals that it believes could potentially plot and direct global attacks. How this impacts on al-Zawahiri’s 
strategic calculus remains to be seen especially as he has lost a key Egyptian supporter. If the past few years 
are to serve as an exemplar, when close allies of al-Zawahiri have been killed in U.S. operations, the al-Qaeda 
leader has refrained to comment or resort to fiery rhetoric without following it up with terrorist activity.
An Egyptian Obsession and AfPak Sanctuary
Before he was declared to be one of the most wanted terrorists by the United States, al-Zawahiri had been 
the most wanted man in Egypt. Whether it was his role in the 1974 plot by the Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami 
(Islamic Party of Liberation) to take over the Military Technical College near Cairo, the 1981 assassination 
of the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, or the EIJ’s series of direct attacks against the Hosni Mubarak regime 
in the 1990s, al-Zawahiri managed to absolve himself, avoid capital punishment and ultimately escape to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.[42]
On August 13, 2016, al-Zawahiri issued the first of a series of Brief Messages to a Victorious Ummah.[43] 
In the first episode, Who Protects the Mus’haf (compiled pages of the Qur’an), al-Zawahiri argued that the 
failure of the Muslim Brotherhood to take advantage of the Arab Spring symbolised its inability to create an 
Islamic state in Egypt and across the wider Arab world. Al-Zawahiri stated, “…[Egypt] represents the flagrant 
pattern of the Muslims’ failure if they are disabled and deviated, and it demonstrates the truth of the Crusaders’ 
enmity if they are transgressed upon. What is drawn from Egypt can be applied elsewhere.” [44]
Al-Zawahiri argued the Muslim Brotherhood failed Egypt because its leaders kept cooperating with various 
Egyptian governments and participated in elections which neglected and weakened its founder Hassan 
al-Banna’s original mission of creating an Islamic state. [45] Al-Zawahiri’s goal behind his message was to 
illustrate that Egypt remained a strategic and ideological priority which al-Qaeda would never abandon and 
they represented a more viable alternative in establishing an Islamic state than the Muslim Brotherhood.
Citing Egyptian colonial history to justify a current ideological position, al-Zawahiri also lays into al-
Banna for showing support “for King Fuad [1922 – 1936], who was not only a corrupt ruler…but was also a 
subservient tool in the hands of the English, the occupiers of Egypt.”[46] Ironically, al-Zawahiri ignores the fact 
that his paternal grandfather, Shaykh al-Aḥmadi al-Zawahiri, who was an Imam of Egypt’s historic al-Azhar 
seminary, was very unpopular because he was seen as a close ally of King Fuad.[47]
In the second episode of Brief Messages to a Victorious Ummah, subtitled Be Not Divided Among Yourselves, 
al-Zawahiri focused on, and reiterated his support for, the Taliban and called on all jihadists in the world to 
“rally around the emirate,” referring to the Taliban’s ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ where al-Qaeda had a 
safe base before 9/11. [48] On the surface, al-Zawahiri’s staunch support for the Taliban is not surprising, as 
al-Qaeda is still dependent on the Taliban for protection and sanctuary in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Yet, al-Zawahiri’s relationship with the Taliban is complex. Prior to 9/11, he was reluctant to endorse bin 
Laden’s pledge of allegiance (bay’ah) to Mullah Omar.[49] Al-Zawahiri did not believe that his strategic or 
ideological priorities were in Afghanistan but instead his eyes were always on the situation in Egypt.[50]
On 12 July, 2015, Islamic State issued an audio statement followed by an article in its Dabiq magazine, 
claiming that the Taliban’s leader Mullah Omar was dead. This forced the Taliban to confirm officially Mullah 
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Omar’s death on 29 July, 2015.[51] Noticeably silent was al-Zawahiri, especially when three of al-Qaeda’s 
franchises, Jabhat al-Nusra, AQAP and AQIM, issued a joint eulogy praising the late Mullah Omar.[52]
Eventually in August, 2015, after almost one year of silence from commenting on any issue, al-Zawahiri 
resurfaced and not only affirmed his bay’ah to the new head of the Taliban, Mullah Mansour, but also 
described him as the Emir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful) instead of usurping the honorific 
title for himself and thereby challenging Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s claim of Caliph directly. [53] Mansour 
accepted al-Zawahiri’s bay’ah and reciprocated by describing him as “the leader of international Jihadi 
organization.”[54]
Al-Zawahiri’s speech was dated August 1, 2015, and had been recorded only two days after Mullah Omar’s 
death was finally confirmed by the Taliban on July 30, where they admitted that Mullah Omar had died 
on April 23, 2013, over two years before the public announcement of his death.[55] The Taliban claimed 
that they kept the death of Mullah Omar a secret for tactical reasons. Al-Zawahiri did not comment on the 
sensitive issue whether or not he knew that Mullah Omar had died long ago. Had he done so, it could have 
been interpreted as evidence that he had been deceiving his followers for years, pledging bay’ah to a dead 
person. If al-Zawahiri was not among the few insiders who knew that Mullah Omar had passed away long 
ago, this would have indicated that he was not as close to the leadership of the Taliban as bin Laden had been. 
Following Manosur’s elimination in a U.S. drone strike on 21 May, 2016, al-Zawahiri pledged allegiance to his 
successor, Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, in the hope that this would strengthen the relationship with 
al-Qaeda.[56] However, it is interesting that as of yet, Akhundzada has not accepted al-Zawahiri’s pledge in 
public.
Al-Zawahiri supports the Afghan Taliban, partly out of necessity to maintain a safe base, but also because 
the Afghan Taliban is experiencing competition from Islamic State’s Afghan affiliate, Wilayat Khorasan 
(Khorasan Province), a group that has concentrated its attacks in a few districts in the country’s eastern 
provinces, including Nangarhar.[57] Another reason why al-Zawahiri is keen on maintaining a close 
connection with the Taliban is to strengthen the affiliate al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS).
[58] AQIS is developing a sanctuary in the Pakistani port city of Karachi and in the Helmand province in 
Afghanistan which form part of a logistical thread. From Karachi, AQIS can transfer fighters, funds and 
messages through to the border city of Quetta, which is also where elements of the Taliban are based. From 
there they can easily cross Afghanistan’s porous borders and access its southern provinces.[59] Previously, 
in July 2015, U.S. forces dismantled an al-Qaeda camp in Kandahar province.[60] Within this context, AQIS 
could be utilized to revitalise al-Qaeda locally which is why al-Zawahiri was calling for Ghazwa al-Hind 
(Battle to Reunite India) a generic term for all of South Asia. [61]
The Safavids and Opaque Relationships
In the third part of his Brief Messages to a Victorious Ummah, al-Zawahiri urged Sunni Muslim fighters in 
Iraq to regroup and launch a protracted insurgency against what he described as the conspiratorial “Safavid-
Crusader occupation” that supports Shiite militias.[62] In his speech, titled Allah, Allah in Iraq, al-Zawahiri 
claimed that Iran and the United States have a “scheme” to eliminate Sunni Muslims in Iraq under the excuse 
of fighting Islamic State.[63] The Safavid dynasty was one of the most significant Shiite Persian empires 
during the 16 and 17th centuries. Al-Zawahiri’s use of the term ‘Safavid’ therefore implies Iran has imperial 
ambitions to subjugate Sunni Muslims. [64] Al-Zawahiri would later again repeat the “Safavid” reference in 
The Defiers of Injustice.[65] In dealing with Iran, al-Zawahiri was building on his earlier General Guidelines 
for Jihad. In that text he had ordered al-Qaeda to “avoid fighting the deviant sects,” a reference to Shiite 
Muslim civilians.[66] This separates al-Qaeda’s policy from the one of Islamic State which has a policy of 
deliberately attacking unarmed Shiite civilians.[67]
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Al-Zawahiri’s Allah, Allah in Iraq is also a renewal of an idea he had previously articulated in 2009 in an 
“interview” with as-Sahab, entitled The Facts of Jihad and the Lies of Hypocrisy. [68] In that text he had railed 
against Iran and Shiite scholars for not only failing to issue fatwas (authoritative legal opinion) against the 
“invading Crusaders in Iraq and Afghanistan” but also for choosing to become their “preferred partner”.
[69] Despite such public rhetoric, al-Qaeda has an ambiguous relationship with Iran’s theocratic regime. 
Al-Zawahiri’s deputies Abu al-Khayr al-Masri and Saif al-Adel, were both held under house arrest in Iran 
until being released in March 2015 in a prisoner exchange for an Iranian diplomat who had been abducted 
in Yemen.[70] This would suggest that there are still direct channels of communications between Tehran, 
al-Qaeda and its affiliates. There are other pieces of evidence supporting such a view. In July 2011, the 
U.S. Treasury Department designated six members of an al-Qaeda network as terrorists. Abbottabad also 
highlighted the importance of Iran to al-Qaeda. One document revealed that bin Laden had sent a message 
to one of his operatives called Kareem in 2007, telling him not to threaten Iran because “You know that Iran is 
our main artery for funds, personnel, and communication, as well as for the matter of hostages.”[71]
In 2014, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the then head of external operations of Islamic State, issued a message 
entitled Iran’s Heavy Debt to al-Qaeda, during which al-Adnani attacked al-Zawahiri, for preventing 
jihadists from targeting Iran in the past in order to preserve al-Qaeda’s strategic interests.[72] Al-Adnani 
stated, “Islamic State followed the guidance of al-Jihad sheikhs and symbols, so it did not strike the Shiites 
in Iran since its inception, and left Rafidis [rejectionists] safe in Iran. It reined back its infuriated soldiers 
despite their ability, at the time, to fill Iran with pools of blood. It swallowed its anger all these years bearing 
accusations of treachery for not targeting its worst enemies, leaving the Rafidis enjoying security pursuant to 
al-Qaeda’s order to maintain its interests and lines of supply in Iran.” [73] Ironically, some years before, when 
al-Zawahiri succeeded bin Laden in 2011, he had been given the honorific title of “wise man of the ummah,” 
by al-Adnani.[74]
Another significant figure who had resided in Iran following the 9/11 attacks was bin Laden’s son, Hamza, 
also known as Abu Moaz.[75] Al-Zawahiri is utilizing the bin Laden brand name to recover al-Qaeda’s appeal 
by summoning Osama bin Laden’s charisma through his son whom he appears to be grooming. Together, 
they have coordinated the simultaneous release of some of al-Qaeda’s messages in recent years where they 
have threatened revenge against the United States for the death of Osama bin Laden.[76] However, there 
is also a much more personal motive for al-Zawahiri to cultivate bin Laden’s son. Hamza is married to al-
Zawahiri’s daughter and he has two children from her, Khairiah and Saad.[77]Al-Zawahiri is therefore able to 
keep the bin Laden legacy firmly attached to his own doctrine through a strategic marriage alliance.
In a 2015 speech, Ayman al-Zawahiri presented Hamza bin Laden as “son of the lion of jihad,” before calling 
on al-Qaeda’s followers to fight against the “Americans, Jews, and the rest of the West.” [78] Hamza bin 
Laden’s speeches have revived the image and words of his father when he said “We [al-Qaeda] will continue 
striking you and targeting you in your country and abroad.” [79] He was eerily direct when he threatened 
America and the West and promised to avenge the death of his father. Hamza bin Laden has subsequently 
also been listed as a ‘global terrorist’ by the United States.[80]
The Solid Structure
On 29 August, 2016, al-Zawahiri released his fourth, and what appeared at the time to be the final message, 
in the series Brief Messages to a Victorious Ummah, entitled The Solid Structure.[81] Opportunistically, it was 
released on the 50th anniversary of the execution of the Egyptian ideologue Sayyid Qutb.[82] Qutb had a 
close connection to al-Zawahiri’s family and also an ideological bearing on him. Al-Zawahiri would often 
cite Qutb in al-Qaeda’s propaganda statements and described him as “the most prominent theoretician of the 
jihadist movement.”[83] Al-Zawahiri’s maternal grand uncle, Mahfouz Azzam, had been one of the defence 
lawyers for Qutb, following his arrest in 1965 after the publication of his provocative treatise Milestones which 
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spoke about the need for violent revolutions through jihad.[84] Azzam was given Qutb’s power of attorney 
when he was sentenced to death for plotting against Egyptian President Gamal Nasser.[85]
In The Solid Structure, al-Zawahiri took a page from Qutb’s seminal book Milestones, by speaking of the 
need for the “revival” of a Sharia (Islamic law) body to arbitrate differences and disputes, and a Shura 
(consultative) Council that would “harness the power of the Ummah against the tyrants and invaders.”[86] In 
doing so, al-Zawahiri was asserting the importance of consistency behind the jihadist ideology. However, he 
did not provide details on how such a Sharia body would practically function.
Al-Zawahiri has also viscerally attacked Islamic State and al-Baghdadi, accusing them for causing divisions 
and fragmentation amongst the jihadists with their “innovated caliphate.”[87] Al-Zawahiri described them 
as “neo-Kharijites” based on the term Khawarij (Outsiders), a historical and derogatory reference to a 
sect, active during the first century of Islam, which had mutinied against the fourth caliph Ali whom they 
assassinated.[88] In labelling Islamic State as Khawarij, which he had done before on several occasions, al-
Zawahiri was effectively calling for their Qatl Ad (total extermination).[89]
The historical Khawarij pursued takfir, the excommunication and killing of Muslims accused of lacking 
faith or abandoning Islam, a tactic that Islamic State currently uses against Iraqi and Syrian Muslims. This 
strategy was forged by Islamic State’s predecessor entity, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) whose infamous founder, the 
Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, had introduced excessive brutality towards the Iraqi population as a tool 
to control and subjugate them.[90] In a 2005 letter to al-Zarqawi, al-Zawahiri had criticized him for killing 
Muslims, urging al-Zarqawi to stop because his actions were toxifying the al-Qaeda brand and would reduce 
AQI’s support base.[91]
Nevertheless, in August 2015, when al-Zawahiri came out of his 11-month period of public silence, in 
addition to affirming his bay’ah to Mullah Manosur, the al-Qaeda leader also chose to describe al-Zarqawi 
as one of the “good martyrs.”[92] By doing so, al-Zawahiri was offering a veiled criticism of Islamic State. 
Despite his strong differences with al-Zarqawi, al- Zawahiri was claiming the former AQI leader died for al-
Qaeda and al-Zawahiri’s ideological platform, thereby implying al-Baghdadi has betrayed the original cause.
Not Bowing to Islamic State
Since 2014, the rivalry between al-Qaeda and Islamic State has not only been based on ideological disputes 
but was based also on strategic priorities, particularly regarding the question of what are permissible levels of 
violence against Shiites and other religious minorities, and the order of priorities when it comes to fighting 
Arab regimes and the West. During this period, al-Zawahiri’s doctrine has been plagued by contradictions 
and shifts. This surfaced again on 5 January 2017, when al-Qaeda released a message from al-Zawahiri, To 
Other Than Allah We Will Not Bow, which was primarily aimed at asserting his jihadist credentials and restate 
al-Qaeda’s operational priorities, whilst at the same time denouncing Islamic State. [93]
Curiously, this message was Part Five of al-Zawahiri’s Brief Messages to a Victorious Nation. Part Four had 
been issued back on 29 August, 2016, leaving a significant gap between them. It is likely that Part Five was 
more a defensive reaction by al-Zawahiri who was preoccupied with stemming what he called a campaign 
to “discredit, intimidate and alienate” al-Qaeda, conducted by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Islamic State.[94] 
Al-Zawahiri, referred to al-Baghdadi as a “liar” and as being “blasphemous”, trying to counter a litany of 
allegations from Islamic State, including claims that al-Qaeda did not condemn un-Islamic regimes; had been 
praising ousted Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood; willing to let Christians 
share power as partners; not practicing takfir against Shiites and critically, abandoning the goal of targeting 
the United States.[95]
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This appeared to unnerve al-Zawahiri, who aggressively defended his choices and his own reputation, which 
further implies that Part Five could have been an unintended sequel to the “Brief Messages to a Victorious 
Nation.” Regarding Shiites, al-Zawahiri stated, “The liars insist upon their falsehood, to the extent that they 
claimed we do not denounce Shiites”.[96] Al-Zawahiri claimed that al-Qaeda’s condemnation of the Shiites 
was reflected in the General Guidelines for Jihad which had been sent to Islamic State before it was officially 
published. Al-Zawahiri also denied he had said that Christians could be partners in the governance of a 
future Islamic caliphate, “What I have said is that they are partners in the land, such as agriculture, trade, 
and money, and we keep their privacy in it, in accordance with the laws of our Sharia”.[97] Al-Zawahiri 
insisted he had not called for Shiite Muslims to be spared, but believed there should not be random attacks 
against civilians but instead attacks should focus on Shiite-led Iraqi forces described by al-Zawahiri as rafidah 
(rejectionists).[98]
In the battle against what he described as the “Secular-Crusader-Safawi-Chinese-Hindu campaign,” al-
Zawahiri laid out eleven directives for al-Qaeda, some of which reiterated the group’s original doctrine as well 
as other aspects that had been revised by al-Zawahiri following bin Laden’s death in 2011:
1. Al-Qaeda is not infallible and can occasionally make mistakes and must listen to advice to establish 
the correct methodology and methods to support Islam and jihad;
2. Prioritizing the jihad against the United States whilst adapting to the practical reality of the situation 
based on consensus;
3. Obeying Sharia law and uniting the Ummah around monotheism;
4. Liberate Muslim lands from indigenous disbelievers and apostate agents;
5. Freeing Muslim prisoners;
6. Stop the systematic looting of Muslim wealth;
7. Support and aid Muslims in their revolutions against the corrupt oppressive tyrants;
8. Uniting the different mujahedeen groups and promoting cooperation, collaboration and coordination;
9. The pursuit of a Caliphate;
10. Refrain from harming Muslims through bombings, killings or kidnappings;
11. Give victory to oppressed and weak Muslims.[99]
Al-Zawahiri’s message concluded with a piece of polemic prose, reiterating al-Qaeda threats against the 
United States and blaming the Americans for all the problems across the Middle East.[100] However, despite 
reiterating to Islamic State and the world that the United States was a priority target, what was significantly 
missing from al-Zawahiri’s message is that there was no explanation why al-Qaeda had not again in recent 
years successfully targeted the West, and in particular the United States. It is clear there remains a strong 
aspirational goal to target the West but aside from the ideology, there is no mentioning by al-Zawahiri of 
tactics or targets. This stands in stark contrast to Islamic State which clearly lays out its strategy, often through 
new media, for followers to pursue.
Conclusion
Al-Zawahiri has shown pragmatism by not only tailoring his remarks to current realities on the ground but 
also on the realistic will, capabilities, and nature of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. This is why he has prioritised 
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on courses of action that are local to the Arab and Islamic world, including countering the Iranian sponsored 
Shiite militias in Iraq, despite the ambiguous relationship; Support the Taliban in Afghanistan, partly out of 
necessity; Counter and challenge Islamic State and oppose “apostate” regimes like those in Egypt and Syria. 
All of these strategic priorities have been interspersed by al-Zawahiri with calls for attacks against the West 
and, in particular, the United States.
However, to achieve these objectives, al-Zawahiri believes that it is not enough to successfully carry out 
trans-national attacks, which al-Qaeda cannot currently sustain, but there has to be a strategy to win battles 
which are based on the requirement that al-Qaeda and its affiliates possess safe bases in the heart of the Arab 
and Islamic world. Despite the fact that Islamic State has similar ideological goals as al-Qaeda, al-Zawahiri 
is eager not only to condemn Islamic State, and on occasions to be on the defensive, but also present a viable 
alternative for jihadists that see al-Baghdadi’s project slowly start to wane.
Many of the doctrines about the Near Enemy from al-Zawahiri’s recent speeches are an updated revision 
from those he had developed in his EIJ days. Consequently, while there is some disconnect between al-
Zawahiri prioritising the Near Enemy over the Far Enemy, with his frequent use of the ‘Crusader’ label, it 
is a small gap in terms of the jihadist community that he is attempting to galvanise because it still serves a 
purpose in connecting the Far Enemy with the problems in the Islamic world.
Therefore, in al-Zawahiri’s mind, the ensuing battle against the “apostate regimes” of the Near Enemy cannot 
be considered an entirely regional struggle if the Far Enemy is acting as their security guarantor. For him, 
the Far Enemy will not change in the near future and therefore the conflict against them can be revisited if 
the primary objective against the Near Enemy is unsuccessful. This could include targeting the remaining 
Western military presence in Afghanistan that supports the Kabul government. Equally, if the violent road to 
regime change is impeded in pro-Western countries, such as Egypt, under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, or if 
Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and al-Qaeda find their operations in Syria stymied by Western air-strikes, al-Zawahiri 
may advocate taking the battle to the West once again.
Although it is likely that al-Zawahiri will ideologically react towards U.S. President Donald Trump’s 
administration with fire and brimstone, on practical terms, the al-Qaeda leader is unlikely to operationally 
steer away from his cautious approach towards the Far Enemy until he feels al-Qaeda is able to endure any 
potential backlash. One successful attack in the United States may only result in severe repercussions that 
could permanently disable al-Qaeda which has still not fully regenerated. Above everything else, al-Zawahiri 
is obsessed in his self-preservation. After over 40 years of jihadist activity, he has developed a knack for 
staying alive and despite his desire to die as a ‘martyr,’ he will not voluntarily sacrifice himself. Furthermore, 
al-Zawahiri has a vested interest in cultivating his family ties to Hamza bin Laden, and to use the name to 
further the agenda and brand of al-Qaeda whilst ensuring his ideological thumbprint remains attached to the 
group’s next generation.
In recent years, Islamic State has been more of a threat to al-Qaeda than the West. It is Islamic State that has 
challenged al-Qaeda’s doctrine, recruited more fighters, expanded its territorial base, exposed al-Zawahiri’s 
inconsistencies and highlighted al-Qaeda’s opaque relationships with countries like Iran. Therefore, al-
Zawahiri will gladly let Islamic State face the focus and brunt of the international coalition in Iraq and Syria, 
whilst at the same time hoping that any potential breathing space will enable al-Qaeda to reconstitute its 
infrastructure and networks across the Islamic world.
Al-Qaeda has not abandoned its plans to target the West, but it is not the only priority. In the short-term, 
al-Zawahiri’s global relevance will remain, albeit in an understated way, which potentially makes him 
more dangerous in the longer-term, especially as his priority on survival and operational security remains 
paramount and this longevity enables him to outlast his rivals from Islamic State.
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